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MENTAL HEALTH—SEX OFFENDERS: 
THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT CONTEMPLATES 
THE USE OF SELF-INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS 
WHILE DENYING A PETITION FOR DISCHARGE 




In In re G.R.H., the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court’s order rejecting G.R.H.’s petition for discharge from commitment as 
a sexually dangerous individual.  G.R.H.’s previous criminal history, his 
confessions during treatment, his diagnosis of anti-social personality dis-
order and sexual attraction to adolescents, and his lack of self-control 
satisfied the definition of a sexually dangerous individual.  G.R.H. dis-
closed he had contact with previously unknown adolescent victims during a 
homework exercise and polygraph at a treatment center.  In her concur-
rence, Justice Kapsner labeled these disclosures as self-incriminating state-
ments.  Distinguishing In re G.R.H. from Allen v. Illinois, Justice Kapsner 
explained that North Dakota’s sexually dangerous individual commitment 
jurisprudence allows a trial court to consider both refusal to disclose and 
disclosure of additional sexually predatory conduct as evidence of the need 
to continue commitment.  Additionally, North Dakota law currently pro-
hibits the use of final determinations of civil commitments as evidence in 
subsequent criminal proceedings, but North Dakota law is silent as to the 
use of evidence considered in order to determine whether someone is a 
sexually dangerous individual.  In re G.R.H. has fueled challenges to civil 
commitments of sexually dangerous individuals based upon the use of self-
incriminating statements.  The facts of In re G.R.H. reveal the need to 
amend the commitment statutes to limit the use of self-incriminating state-
ments disclosed during treatment to the hearing for determination of a 
sexually dangerous individual and prohibit the use of those statements in 
subsequent criminal proceedings. 
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In 1994, G.R.H. was convicted of felony gross sexual imposition for 
having consensual sex with a female five years his junior.1  Only nineteen 
at the time of the offense, G.R.H. spent three years in prison before being 
                                                     
1. Brief of Respondent-Appellant at 3, In re G.R.H., 2006 ND 56, 711 N.W.2d 587 (No. 
20040287).  G.R.H. was sentenced to ten years in state prison for this conviction. In re G.R.H. 
(G.R.H. I), 2006 ND 56, ¶ 2, 711 N.W.2d 587, 589. 
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paroled and put on probation in 1997.2  Within two years of his parole, 
G.R.H. was convicted of a crime on three more occasions.3  The most seri-
ous of the three convictions, felony corruption of a minor, was for sexual 
contact with a sixteen-year-old female.4  G.R.H. served five years in jail as 
a result of the new convictions and the revocation of his parole for the 1994 
conviction.5 
Prior to G.R.H.’s scheduled release in 2004, the State filed a petition to 
civilly commit the twenty-nine-year-old G.R.H. as a sexually dangerous 
individual.6  The district court found G.R.H. to be a sexually dangerous 
individual, and the court committed him to a treatment facility.7  G.R.H. 
brought an appeal of the district court’s order for commitment before the 
North Dakota Supreme Court, arguing there was insufficient evidence to 
justify commitment as a sexually dangerous person.8  G.R.H. also argued 
the commitment violated constitutional due process and double jeopardy 
provisions.9  However, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed G.R.H.’s 
commitment.10 
G.R.H. first requested to be discharged from commitment in August 
2005, but no hearing was held because the outcome of the appeal of his 
initial commitment was still pending.11  His second request for discharge 
                                                     
2. Brief of Petitioner-Appellee at 1, In re G.R.H., 2006 ND 56, 711 N.W.2d 587 (No. 
20040287).  G.R.H.’s parole was revoked in 1998, and he served ninety days in jail for failing to 
notify his probation officer of his change of address, ceasing sex offender treatment, and failing to 
register as a sex offender. Id. at 1-2. 
3. Id. at 2.  The convictions were misdemeanor delivery of alcohol to a minor, misdemeanor 
failure to register as a sex offender, and felony corruption or solicitation of a minor. Id. 
4. Brief of Respondent-Appellant, supra note 1, at 3.  G.R.H. was twenty-four years old 
when he had sexual contact, involving oral sex, with a minor. Id. 
5. Brief of Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 2, at 2-3. 
6. G.R.H. I, ¶ 3, 711 N.W.2d at 589.  North Dakota defines “sexually dangerous individual” 
as: 
an individual who is shown to have engaged in sexually predatory conduct and who 
has a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a per-
sonality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction that makes that individual 
likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct which constitute a dan-
ger to the physical or mental health or safety of others.  It is a rebuttable presumption 
that sexually predatory conduct creates a danger to the physical or mental health or 
safety of the victim of the conduct.  For these purposes, mental retardation is not a 
sexual disorder, personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction. 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-03 (2008).  See § 25-03.3-03 (providing statutory basis for a petition 
to commit a sexually dangerous individual).  If such a petition is successful, the individual is 
committed to a treatment facility. § 25-03.3-13. 
7. G.R.H. I, ¶ 3, 711 N.W.2d at 589-90. 
8. Id. ¶ 7, 711 N.W.2d at 590. 
9. Id. ¶ 10, 711 N.W.2d at 592. 
10. Id. ¶ 28, 711 N.W.2d at 597. 
11. In re G.R.H. (G.R.H. II), 2008 ND 222, ¶ 2, 758 N.W.2d 719, 721.  The committed 
sexually dangerous individual is notified at least once a year that he is entitled to a discharge 
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was denied in 2006.12  Another request was made in 2007, and the district 
court scheduled a hearing on the matter in the spring of 2008.13  Prior to the 
hearing, two experts evaluated G.R.H., as well as his records, and came to 
opposite conclusions as to whether G.R.H. remained a sexually dangerous 
individual.14  During the evaluations, the State’s expert was made aware of 
statements G.R.H. made during treatment.15  These statements revealed 
sexual contact with multiple additional adolescent victims after G.R.H.’s 
first release from prison.16  Agreeing with the State’s evaluator, the district 
court determined G.R.H. remained a sexually dangerous individual.17 
G.R.H. appealed the district court’s order, this time arguing the State 
failed to provide sufficient evidence satisfying the three-element definition 
of “sexually dangerous individual” under North Dakota statute.18  Affirm-
ing the district court, a majority of the North Dakota Supreme Court held 
the State met its burden of proof to show G.R.H. remained a sexually 
dangerous individual and, therefore, the court denied the petition for dis-
charge.19  Justice Kapsner concurred but wrote separately to explain G.R.H. 
could have challenged the commitment arguing it was punitive in effect.20  
But, because G.R.H. failed to raise this issue, the court affirmed the district 
court’s order.21 
                                                                                                                           
hearing and may file a petition for discharge with the court that committed him. § 25-03.3-18 
(2008). 
12. G.R.H. II, ¶ 2, 758 N.W.2d at 721. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. ¶ 3, 758 N.W.2d at 721.  The State’s evaluator concluded G.R.H. remained a sexually 
dangerous individual, while the independent evaluator determined G.R.H. was not a sexually 
dangerous person. Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 758 N.W.2d at 721. 
15. Id. ¶ 8, 758 N.W.2d at 722. 
16. Id.  “In addition to the offenses for which he had been convicted, G.R.H. has admitted to 
having had sexual contact with a 13- and a 14-year-old girl when he was 19; a 17-year-old girl 
when he was 24; a 13-, a 14-, a 16-, and two 17-year-old girls when he was 25; and a 16-year-old 
girl when he was 27.” Id. 
17. Id. ¶ 5, 758 N.W.2d at 721. 
18. Id. ¶¶ 8, 12, 758 N.W.2d at 722-23.  On petition for discharge, the State must provide 
clear and convincing evidence that the individual: 
[1] engaged in sexually predatory conduct . . . [2] has a congenital or acquired 
condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other 
mental disorder or dysfunction [3] that makes that individual likely to engage in 
further acts of sexually predatory conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or 
mental health or safety of others. 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-01(8) (2008). 
19. G.R.H. II, ¶¶ 11, 13-14, 758 N.W.2d at 723-24. 
20. Id. ¶ 26, 758 N.W.2d at 727 (Kapsner, J., concurring). 
21. Id. ¶ 27, 758 N.W.2d at 727. 
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Liberty is one of the basic rights secured from erroneous deprivation by 
the United States Constitution.22  Liberty has long been held to include 
“freedom from physical restraint,” although this protection is not absolute.23  
In fact, incarceration has become the dominant form of punishment for 
criminals.24  In the interest of liberty, certain procedural safeguards are 
available to criminal defendants when incarceration is at stake.25  Confine-
ment has also been used in civil matters as a means to protect the safety of 
the public from people who are unable to control their actions.26  The 
United States Supreme Court, however, has struggled with deciding what 
procedural safeguards should be available to those who are confined under 
civil law.27  This section focuses on how the United States Supreme Court 
has addressed challenges to civil commitment statutes and examines North 
Dakota’s approach to the civil commitment of sexually dangerous 
individuals in light of federal precedent. 
A. THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL DIVIDE 
An explanation of the purpose of criminal law and civil law is some-
times used in order to distinguish the two.28  Criminal law is meant to 
punish defendants who have committed an offense against society.29  Civil 
law, on the other hand, is meant to make a person or entity whole for 
damage sustained as a result of actions originated by the adverse party.30  
The divide between the two types of law may be obvious in many situa-
tions, but it becomes less clear when the proceedings are more of a hybrid.31  
Commitment of sexually dangerous individuals often encompasses 
                                                     
22. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
23. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997). 
24. Alan M. Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement:  Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123 
U. PA. L. REV. 297, 297 (1974). 
25. Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 679, 
686 (1999).  See generally U.S. CONST. amends. V-VI, VIII (providing protections such as grand 
jury indictment, prohibition of double jeopardy, right against self-incrimination, due process, 
speedy trial, jury trial, right to confrontation, assistance of counsel, and prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishment). 
26. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357. 
27. See generally Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 374 (1986) (deciding whether the Fifth 
Amendment right prohibiting the use of self-incriminating statements applies to civil 
commitment); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369-71 (deciding whether prohibition against double 
jeopardy or the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to civil commitments). 
28. Klein, supra note 25, at 679-80. 
29. Id. at 679. 
30. Id. at 679-80. 
31. Id. at 680. 
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confinement, a feature normally associated with criminal sanctions.32  Yet, 
commitment of the sexually dangerous is considered civil because it allows 
the State to take care of individuals that cannot take care of themselves.33 
1. Non-Punitive Purpose 
Beginning in Allen v. Illinois,34 the United States Supreme Court 
examined the hybrid nature of civil commitment statutes while remaining 
cognizant of the purpose of those laws.35  In Allen, the trial court ordered 
the petitioner to submit to a psychiatric evaluation, and, over the 
petitioner’s objection, the psychiatrists testified to their opinions that the 
petitioner was likely to commit sexual offenses in the future.36  The trial 
court declared the petitioner a sexually dangerous person after finding the 
petitioner’s actions indicated he was likely to commit sex offenses.37  On 
appeal, the petitioner argued the Illinois law relating to civil commitment of 
sexually dangerous persons was criminal in nature; thus, the State’s use of 
self-incriminating statements violated the petitioner’s Fifth Amendment 
rights.38  The United States Supreme Court held the Illinois law was not 
criminal, so the petitioner was not entitled to protection against self-
incrimination.39 
While the Supreme Court determined the Illinois law was civil rather 
than criminal, the Court explained a civil label was not dispositive.40  
Instead, the Court determined it was necessary to evaluate the “purpose or 
effect” of the law in order to determine whether the law was so punitive as 
to “negate the State’s intention” that the law be civil.41  Using this standard, 
the Court held the purpose of commitment was not to punish, but rather to 
provide treatment for the offenders only as long as they needed it.42  The 
                                                     
32. Id. 
33. Aman Ahluwalia, Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators:  The Search for a Limiting 
Principle, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 489, 492 (2006). 
34. 478 U.S. 364 (1986). 
35. Allen, 478 U.S. at 368-69.  While this was the first examination of civil commitment of 
the sexually dangerous, the Supreme Court previously addressed the standard of proof necessary 
for civil commitment of the mentally ill.  See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429-33 (1979) 
(distinguishing traditional civil commitment proceedings from criminal proceedings and holding 
the standard of proof for traditional civil commitment proceedings was “clear and convincing”). 
36. Allen, 478 U.S. at 366.  The petitioner’s statements to the psychiatrists were not 
admissible, but the psychiatric opinions based upon the statements were admissible. Id. 
37. Id. at 366-67. 
38. Id. at 365-66.  The Fifth Amendment provides no person “shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
39. Allen, 478 U.S. at 375. 
40. Id. at 369. 
41. Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986)). 
42. Id. at 369-70. 
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Court found important the fact the Illinois statute at issue expressly stated 
the law was “civil in nature.”43  The Court also reasoned the law was not 
punitive in effect because it allowed release upon a showing that the 
individual was no longer dangerous and because the law disavowed the 
main goals of punishment: retribution and deterrence.44  Accordingly, the 
Court held the condition of the offender’s confinement was not punitive; 
therefore, the State’s intention was not negated.45 
In Kansas v. Hendricks,46 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its purpose 
approach to laws related to civil commitment of the sexually dangerous.47  
In Hendricks, a Kansas law for the civil commitment of the sexually 
dangerous went into effect shortly before Hendricks, an individual with a 
history of molesting children, was to be released from prison.48  Hendricks 
was committed after a jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hendricks 
was a sexually violent predator.49  The Kansas Supreme Court reversed 
Hendricks’ commitment by ruling the state law violated substantive due 
process because it did not require a finding of mental illness.50  The United 
States Supreme Court granted the State of Kansas’ petition for certiorari 
and Hendricks’ cross petition.51  Hendricks’ cross-petition argued his forced 
confinement was punishment, the result of a criminal proceeding, and 
therefore the Constitution’s prohibition against double jeopardy and ex post 
facto laws applied.52 
Looking to the purpose of the statute, the Supreme Court decided the 
statute was non-punitive because it was neither retributive nor a deterrent, 
the two primary objectives of punishment.53  Instead, the purpose of the 
statute was to separate the offenders from the general public and to provide 
the offenders with treatment.54  The Court also clarified that even if the 
committed individual was untreatable, a statute should not be ruled punitive 
                                                     
43. Id. at 368. 
44. Id. at 369-70. 
45. Id. at 374. 
46. 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
47. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368-69. 
48. Id. at 350. 
49. Id. at 355-56. 
50. Id. at 356. 
51. Id. at 350. 
52. Id. at 360-61. 
53. Id. at 361-62.  The statute was not retributive because a criminal conviction is not a pre-
requisite for commitment, nor is it necessary to prove an element of intent, and it was not a 
deterrent because committed individuals suffer from a mental disorder that makes them unable to 
control their actions. Id. at 362-63.  The Court’s finding that the statute was non-punitive 
“remove[d] an essential prerequisite for both Hendricks’ double jeopardy and ex post facto 
claims.” Id. at 369. 
54. Id. at 365. 
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simply for confining the individual for the safety of the public.55  Explain-
ing the legitimate use of confinement in the context of civil law, the Court 
held that Kansas’ requirement of a “mental abnormality” or “personality 
disorder,” coupled with proof of future dangerousness, satisfied the need to 
limit civil commitment to those unable to control their dangerous 
behavior.56 
2. Serious Difficulty in Controlling Behavior 
In Kansas v. Crane,57 the Supreme Court again addressed the require-
ments of civil commitment of the sexually dangerous, this time analyzing 
substantive due process.58  In Crane, the State of Kansas sought to civilly 
commit Crane, a convicted sexual offender who suffered from exhibition-
ism and an anti-social personality disorder.59  While exhibitionism alone 
would not have been enough to classify Crane as a sexual predator, the 
combination of his disorders fell within the requirements of the Kansas 
statute.60  Crane petitioned the trial court for summary judgment, arguing 
both that the State was statutorily required to prove he was likely to commit 
more offenses and that he completely lacked control of his behavior.61  
After the trial court rejected Crane’s request, a jury found beyond a reason-
able doubt that Crane was a sexual predator; Crane was thus committed.62 
On appeal of Crane’s commitment as a sexually violent predator, the 
Kansas Supreme Court held the trial court failed to make a finding that 
Crane was completely unable to control his behavior, as required under 
Hendricks.63  The Kansas Supreme Court had construed Hendricks’ 
language of “unable to control [his] dangerousness” far too strictly.64  
Disagreeing with the state supreme court’s reading of Hendricks, the United 
States Supreme Court held that a total lack of control of one’s behavior was 
not necessary for civil commitment.65  Such a requirement was unrealistic 
and would risk disallowing civil commitment of the most “highly dan-
                                                     
55. Id. at 366. 
56. Id. at 356-60. 
57. 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
58. Crane, 534 U.S. at 409. 
59. Id. at 411.  “The essential feature of Antisocial Personality Disorder is a pervasive pat-
tern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others that begins in childhood or early 
adolescence and continues into adulthood.” AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC 
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-IV-TR) 701 (rev. 4th ed. 2000). 
60. Id. at 416-17 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
61. Id. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
62. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
63. Id. at 411. 
64. Id. at 410-11. 
65. Id. at 413. 
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gerous persons suffering severe mental abnormalities” because even those 
people retain some control over their behavior.66  Instead, a finding of 
“serious difficulty in controlling behavior” was sufficient to distinguish the 
civilly committed sexual offender from the typical criminal.67 
B. NORTH DAKOTA’S COMMITMENT OF THE SEXUALLY DANGEROUS 
North Dakota law has, in many ways, incorporated the United States 
Supreme Court’s approach to challenges of civil commitment statutes.68  In 
fact, the incorporation began in the first appeal of the civil commitment of a 
sexually dangerous individual brought before the North Dakota Supreme 
Court.69  With subsequent challenges, the North Dakota Supreme Court has 
made use of United States Supreme Court precedent to develop the legiti-
macy of commitment of the sexually dangerous under North Dakota law.70  
This section explains how North Dakota has adopted the purpose approach 
to justify the commitment of sexually dangerous individuals, and how the 
state has developed the definition of a sexually dangerous individual. 
1. Adoption of the Purpose Approach 
The 1999 case of In re M.D.71 (M.D. I) involved an individual who 
argued his commitment was improper because it violated the double 
jeopardy prohibition and because there was insufficient evidence to support 
a finding for commitment.72  The North Dakota Supreme Court held the 
state’s double jeopardy clause was not violated because the statute was civil 
and there was sufficient evidence to support the district court’s findings for 
commitment.73  In doing so, the court adopted the United States Supreme 
                                                     
66. Id. at 412. 
67. Id. at 413. 
68. See infra Part II.B.1-2 (explaining North Dakota’s adoption of the non-punitive purpose 
approach and defining sexually dangerous individuals in light of the United States Supreme 
Court’s precedent). 
69. In re M.D. (M.D. I), 1999 ND 160, 598 N.W.2d 799.  Specifically, this was the first 
appeal of the commitment of a sexually dangerous individual under North Dakota Century Code 
chapter 25-03.3. Id. ¶ 33, 598 N.W.2d at 806-07. 
70. See In re R.A.S., 2009 ND 101, ¶ 17, 766 N.W.2d 712, 716 (holding the Crane 
requirement that the individual has a “serious difficulty controlling his behavior” must be shown 
by clear and convincing evidence); In re G.R.H. (G.R.H. I), 2006 ND 56, ¶ 18, 711 N.W.2d 587, 
594-95 (holding North Dakota’s civil commitment statute satisfies the Crane substantive due 
process standard); M.D. I, ¶¶ 26-31, 598 N.W.2d at 805-06 (holding the commitment statute was 
civil rather than criminal; therefore, the appellant’s argument that his commitment violated double 
jeopardy was unfounded). 
71. 1999 ND 160, 598 N.W.2d 799. 
72. M.D. I, ¶¶ 24, 33, 598 N.W.2d at 804, 806-07.  M.D. also challenged his commitment by 
arguing the petition for commitment should have been dismissed because of undue delay and 
improper public disclosure. Id. ¶¶ 11, 19, 598 N.W.2d at 802, 804. 
73. Id. ¶¶ 31, 39, 598 N.W.2d at 806, 808. 
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Court’s purpose approach and established the standard of review when a 
finding of civil commitment of the sexually dangerous is challenged.74 
Noting the similarities between the Kansas and North Dakota statutes, 
the North Dakota Supreme Court utilized the Hendricks analysis to declare 
the North Dakota statute constitutional.75  Applying the Hendricks reason-
ing, the court first examined the legislature’s intent and held the purpose of 
the statute was to create a civil law because it closely mirrored the language 
of the civil commitment of the mentally ill.76  The double jeopardy clause, 
therefore, did not apply unless there was clear proof that the application of 
the statute was so punitive, either in “purpose or effect,” that the State’s 
intent to create a civil statute was invalid.77  The North Dakota Supreme 
Court determined the statute was not punitive because it gave annual notice 
of the right to petition for discharge and confined offenders only as long as 
they were still sexually dangerous individuals.78  The court held the statute 
created a civil proceeding and, therefore, was constitutional.79 
The North Dakota Supreme Court also established the standard of 
review for an appeal of commitment as a sexually dangerous person.80  As a 
case of first impression, the court held the standard of review was “modi-
fied clearly erroneous” and “the [district] court’s findings of fact [would be 
affirmed] unless they [were] induced by an erroneous view of the law” or if 
the court was “firmly convinced [the findings were] not supported by clear 
and convincing evidence.”81  The court’s analysis of the district court’s 
findings focused on whether the presented evidence satisfied the statutory 
definition of a sexually dangerous individual.82  Recognizing that clear and 
convincing evidence was present, the court held the order for M.D.’s 
commitment was proper.83 
                                                     
74. Id. ¶¶ 31, 34, 598 N.W.2d at 806-07. 
75. Id. ¶¶ 26-29, 598 N.W.2d at 805-06. 
76. Id. ¶ 27, 598 N.W.2d at 805. 
77. Id. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)). 
78. M.D. I, ¶ 29, 598 N.W.2d 799, 806.  M.D.’s argument that the statute was punitive was 
similar to the argument made and dismissed in Hendricks. Id. ¶ 29, 598 N.W.2d at 806. 
79. Id. ¶ 31, 598 N.W.2d at 806. 
80. Id. ¶ 33, 598 N.W.2d at 806-07. 
81. Id. ¶ 34, 598 N.W.2d at 807. 
82. Id. ¶¶ 35-39, 598 N.W.2d 799, 807-08. 
83. Id. ¶ 39, 598 N.W.2d at 808.  Looking at M.D.’s previous conviction of gross sexual 
imposition, his diagnosis of paraphilia and personality disorder, and his history of grooming his 
victims, the court found clear and convincing evidence he was a sexually dangerous individual. Id.  
“The essential features of paraphilia are recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual 
urges, or behaviors generally involving[:] 1) nonhuman objects, 2) the suffering or humiliation of 
oneself or one’s partner, or 3) children or other nonconsenting person that occur over a period of 
at least 6 months.” AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-IV-TR) 566 (rev. 4th ed. 2000). 
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2. Definition of a Sexually Dangerous Individual 
Expanding on the foundation laid in M.D. I, a three-element test to 
classify a person as a “sexually dangerous individual” developed from the 
statutory definition under North Dakota law.84  This three-element test has 
been applied to evaluate the initial commitment as well as a petition for 
discharge by a previously committed individual.85  Under the first element, 
the person must have “engaged in sexually predatory conduct.”86  The 
second element requires the person to have “a congenital or acquired condi-
tion that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other 
mental disorder or dysfunction.”87  Under the third element, a court must 
find the disorder makes the person “likely to engage in further acts of 
sexually predatory conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or 
mental health or safety of others.”88  This section addresses each of the 
three elements and discusses the necessity of finding a serious difficulty in 
controlling behavior. 
a. Sexually Predatory Conduct 
The definition of sexually predatory conduct encompasses a wide array 
of generally offensive behavior.89  The behavior includes engaging in, and 
attempting to engage in, sexual acts or sexual contact with the victim, as 
well as forcing the victim to have sexual contact.90  Predatory conduct is 
                                                     
84. In re G.R.H. (G.R.H. I), 2006 ND 56, ¶ 6, 711 N.W.2d 587, 590; N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-
03.3-01(8) (2008).  The chapter pertaining to the civil commitment of sexually dangerous 
individuals, North Dakota Century Code chapter 25-03.3, was enacted in 1997. See G.R.H. I, ¶ 17, 
711 N.W.2d at 590. 
85. Compare G.R.H. I, 2006 ND 56, ¶¶ 6-9, 711 N.W.2d 587, 590-91 (applying the three-
element test to uphold the petitioner’s initial commitment), with In re E.W.F., 2008 ND 130, ¶¶ 9-
16, 751 N.W.2d 686, 689-91 (applying the three-element test to deny petitioner’s request for 
discharge).  The three-element test is utilized to determine who is a sexually dangerous individual, 
but the test is part of a larger commitment process.  See Lori Conroy, Letting in the Light:  The 
Need for Independent Review of Sex Offender Assessments in North Dakota, 85 N.D. L. REV. 171, 
182-83 (2009) (explaining the commitment process from initiation to petition for discharge). 
86. G.R.H. I, ¶ 6, 711 N.W.2d at 590. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. § 25-03.3-01(9)(a)-(b). 
90. Id.  Sexual contact is defined as “any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of an 
individual for the purpose of arousing or satisfying sexual or aggressive desires.” Id. § 25-03.3-
01(7).  Sexual act is defined as: 
[5] sexual contact between human beings, including contact between the penis and the 
vulva, the penis and the anus, the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the 
vulva and the vulva; or the use of an object that comes in contact with the victim’s 
anus, vulva, or penis.  Sexual contact between the penis and the vulva, or between the 
penis and the anus, or an object and the anus, vulva, or penis of the victim, occurs 
upon penetration, however slight.  Emission is not required. 
Id. § 25-03.3-01(6). 
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further explained as having sexual contact under various factual circum-
stances, such as using force or threatening the victim, acting when the 
victim is impaired or incapacitated, acting when the victim is a minor under 
fifteen; incest between a parent or guardian and a minor over the age of 
fifteen is also considered predatory conduct.91  Reviewing an offender’s 
past criminal convictions is sometimes the starting and stopping point for 
inquiry into the first element of sexually predatory conduct.92  Many of 
those committed as sexually dangerous individuals have a criminal history 
that easily satisfies the broad definition of the statute, requiring no further 
analysis.93  When the first element is disputed, the argument often relates to 
the factual circumstances of the crime, such as whether the crime was a 
sexual offense, whether force was used during the crime, or when the 
conviction was overturned.94 
                                                     
91. Id. § 25-03.3-01(9)(a)-(b).  The specific statutory language prohibits sexual contact or 
sexual acts if: 
(1) The victim is compelled to submit by force or by threat of imminent death, serious 
bodily injury, or kidnapping directed toward the victim or any human being, or the 
victim is compelled to submit by any threat that would render an individual of 
reasonable firmness incapable of resisting; 
(2) The victim’s power to appraise or control the victim’s conduct has been substan-
tially impaired by the administration or employment, without the victim’s knowledge, 
of intoxicants or other means for purposes of preventing resistance;  
(3) The actor knows or should have known that the victim is unaware that a sexual act 
is being committed upon the victim;  
(4) The victim is less than fifteen years old;  
(5) The actor knows or should have known that the victim has a disability that substan-
tially impairs the victim’s understanding of the nature of the sexual act or contact;  
(6) The victim is in official custody or detained in a treatment facility, health care 
facility, correctional facility, or other institution and is under the supervisory authority, 
disciplinary control, or care of the actor; or  
(7) The victim is a minor and the actor is an adult[.] 
Id. § 25-03.3-01(9)(a).  Sexual contact is specifically included if:  “(1) The actor knows or should 
have known that the contact is offensive to the victim; or (2) The victim is a minor, fifteen years 
of age or older, and the actor is the minor’s parent, guardian, or is otherwise responsible for 
general supervision of the victim’s welfare.” Id. § 25-03.3-01(9)(b). 
92. See In re M.D. (M.D. I), 1999 ND 160, ¶ 36, 598 N.W.2d 799, 807 (finding the first 
element met by conviction of gross sexual imposition for engaging in sexual acts with a minor). 
93. See In re Barrera, 2008 ND 25, ¶ 6, 744 N.W.2d 744, 746 (finding the first element met 
by conviction of gross sexual imposition with a seven-year-old); In re E.W.F., 2008 ND 130, ¶ 11, 
751 N.W.2d 686, 689 (finding the first element met by conviction of gross sexual imposition for 
molesting a five-year-old); In re J.M., 2006 ND 96, ¶ 12, 713 N.W.2d 518, 522 (finding the first 
element met by conviction of “corruption of a minor involving a sexual act committed on a minor 
victim after [the offender] had sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year-old girl” and a conviction of 
“gross sexual imposition after admitting [the offender] had digitally penetrated a nine-year-old 
girl”); M.D. I, ¶ 36, 598 N.W.2d at 807 (finding the first element met by conviction of gross 
sexual imposition for engaging in sexual acts with a minor). 
94. See, e.g., In re Anderson, 2007 ND 50, ¶ 25, 730 N.W.2d 570, 576 (finding the first 
element met by conviction of sexual assault on fifteen-year-old girl while the offender was 
seventeen, even though the offender argued the assault did not involve force); In re P.F., 2006 ND 
82, ¶¶ 20-21, 712 N.W.2d 610, 615-16 (finding the first element met by conviction of criminal 
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As the North Dakota Supreme Court determined in In re P.F.,95 the 
first element analysis does not always end at convictions.96  In P.F., the 
petitioner argued that his two convictions for criminal trespass were not 
sexual offenses and that an overturned conviction for gross sexual imposi-
tion could not be considered.97  After examining the definition of conduct 
and the context of the statute, the court held sexually predatory conduct 
encompassed all conduct, including conduct that did not result in a charge 
or conviction.98  The court noted the evidence in all three offenses impli-
cated P.F. in predatory conduct.99 
The North Dakota Supreme Court has also determined that sexually 
predatory conduct only includes acts that were specifically described in the 
statutory language.100  In In re Voisine,101 the court evaluated a trial court’s 
finding that sexually predatory conduct included incest between a sixty-five 
year old father and his adult children.102  While the conduct was “criminal 
and morally reprehensible,” it did not satisfy the definition of sexually 
predatory conduct.103  Due to the trial court’s erroneous view of the law, the 
supreme court reversed and remanded.104 
b. Disorder Requirement 
Instead of focusing on criminal history, analysis of the second element 
concentrates on whether the individual has some type of disorder.105  Prior 
to a hearing for commitment, the individual is evaluated by one or more 
State experts and may also retain his or her own expert to evaluate the 
alleged condition.106  The evaluation is based upon all court records and all 
relevant psychological and medical records or reports and may include an 
assessment of the individual.107  Testimony based upon these evaluations 
                                                                                                                           
trespass and overturned conviction of gross sexual imposition because the underlying acts of the 
crime, whether charged for or convicted of, showed sexually predatory conduct). 
95. 2006 ND 82, 712 N.W.2d 610. 
96. P.F., ¶ 21, 712 N.W.2d at 616. 
97. Id. ¶ 20, 712 N.W.2d at 615. 
98. Id. ¶ 21, 712 N.W.2d at 616; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-15 (2008) (noting 
“evidence of prior sexually predatory conduct or criminal conduct, including a record of the 
juvenile court, is admissible” in a proceeding for commitment). 
99. P.F., ¶ 20, 712 N.W.2d at 616. 
100. In re Voisine, 2010 ND 17, ¶ 12, 777 N.W.2d 908, 912. 
101. 2010 ND 17, 777 N.W.2d 908. 
102. Id. ¶¶ 2, 11, 777 N.W.2d at 910, 912. 
103. Id. ¶ 10, 777 N.W.2d at 912. 
104. Id. ¶ 15, 777 N.W.2d at 913. 
105. In re M.B.K., 2002 ND 25, ¶ 11, 639 N.W.2d 473, 476. 
106. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-12 (2008). 
107. Id. 
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aids the trial court in evaluating the second element.108  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court has further noted it is the trial court’s responsibility to 
evaluate the credibility of the expert testimony.109  Consequently, the 
reviewing court will defer to the trial court in the event there is conflicting 
testimony between experts.110 
To satisfy this element, the State must produce expert evidence to show 
the individual has a condition that is made evident through a sexual, person-
ality, or other mental disorder.111  While the definition of “disorder” in the 
context of a sexually dangerous individual does not specify which disorders 
are included, mental retardation is specifically excluded.112  A finding of a 
sexual disorder such as pedophilia satisfies the second element, as does a 
combination of a sexual disorder and a personality disorder.113  However, 
an individual’s disorder does not have to be a sexual disorder.114  For 
instance, a finding of anti-social personality disorder satisfies the second 
element, yet it does not implicate a sexual disorder.115 
There is some authority to suggest anti-social personality disorder 
alone should not satisfy this element.116  Under that authority, the fact that a 
substantial portion of typical criminals could be diagnosed with anti-social 
personality disorder makes the use of that disorder suspect in establishing 
the disorder requirement.117  Nevertheless, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
                                                     
108. See, e.g., In re Anderson, 2007 ND 50, ¶ 29, 730 N.W.2d 570, 577-78 (finding the 
second element met through an evaluator’s testimony about the offender’s anti-social personality 
disorder). 
109. See In re Hehn, 2008 ND 36, ¶ 23, 745 N.W.2d 631, 637 (finding the trial court’s 
reliance on the State’s psychologists, instead of independent evaluators, was not error). 
110. Id. 
111. M.B.K., ¶ 11, 639 N.W.2d at 476 (providing that expert evidence must be admitted 
relating to the offender’s condition); see also § 25-03.3-01(8) (defining the second element as an 
individual “who has a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a 
personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction”). 
112. § 25-03.3-01(8). 
113. See, e.g., In re E.W.F., 2008 ND 130, ¶ 11, 751 N.W.2d 686, 689 (finding the second 
element met by a diagnosis of paraphilia and pedophilia); In re M.D. (M.D. I), 1999 ND 160, ¶ 38, 
598 N.W.2d 799, 808 (finding the second element met by a diagnosis of paraphilia, with a fixation 
on adolescent males, and anti-social personality disorder). 
114. Compare M.D. I, ¶ 38, 598 N.W.2d at 808 (finding the second element met by a 
diagnosis of paraphilia, with a fixation on adolescent males, and anti-social personality disorder), 
with In re J.M., 2006 ND 96, ¶ 13, 713 N.W.2d 518, 522 (finding the second element met by a 
diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder). 
115. See, e.g., J.M., ¶ 13, 713 N.W.2d at 522 (finding the second element met by a diagnosis 
of anti-social personality disorder).  But see In re G.R.H. (G.R.H. I), 2006 ND 56, ¶ 43, 711 
N.W.2d 587, 600 (Kapsner, J., dissenting) (questioning whether a diagnosis of anti-social 
personality disorder satisfies the statutory definition). 
116. See In re Anderson, 2007 ND 50, ¶ 48, 730 N.W.2d 570, 583 (Kapsner, J., dissenting) 
(noting other jurisdictions have determined anti-social personality disorder is insufficient to civilly 
commit a person). 
117. See G.R.H. I, ¶ 40, 711 N.W.2d at 599 (Kapsner, J., dissenting) (explaining “40%-60% 
of the male prison population are diagnosable with antisocial personality disorder.”). 
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has held that, while anti-social personality disorder does not per se meet the 
second element, such a diagnosis is sufficient as long as there is a showing 
of a nexus between the disorder and a serious difficulty controlling one’s 
behavior.118 
c. Future Predatory Conduct 
Using expert testimony, the third element requires a finding that the 
individual’s disorder makes the individual “likely to engage in further acts 
of sexually predatory conduct.”119  Countering an argument that the term 
“likely” is vague, the North Dakota Supreme Court has interpreted the 
phrase to mean the “individual’s propensity towards sexual violence is of 
such a degree as to pose a threat to others.”120  Cognizant of that potential 
danger, the focus of the third element analysis is on the likelihood of 
reoffending and the causal relationship between an individual’s disorder 
and such likelihood.121 
In order to gauge the likelihood of reoffending, expert evaluators often 
utilize actuarial tests as a measurement for recidivism.122  These actuarial 
tests are statistical models that attempt to document a correlation between 
risk factors and certain outcomes.123  Evaluators rate the individual 
according to specific factors depending on the type of test.124 
Among the types of actuarial tests that are commonly used in civil 
commitment of the sexually dangerous are the Rapid Risk Assessment for 
Sexual Offender Recidivism (RRASOR), the Static-99, and the Minnesota 
Sex Offender Screening Tool-Revised (MnSOST-R).125  Designed to mea-
sure recidivism among sex offenders using few variables, the RRASOR 
includes four factors:  “(1) prior sexual offenses, (2) age at risk less than 25, 
                                                     
118. J.M., ¶ 10, 713 N.W.2d at 522. 
119. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-13 (2008).  See also § 25-03.3-01(8) (defining the third 
element as an individual who has a disorder “that makes that individual likely to engage in further 
acts of sexually predatory conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or mental health or 
safety of others”). 
120. In re M.B.K., 2002 ND 25, ¶¶ 12-18, 639 N.W.2d 473, 476-77; see also Ahluwalia, 
supra note 33, at 492 (explaining the “likely” standard of Minnesota, Washington, and 
Wisconsin). 
121. G.R.H. I, ¶ 16, 711 N.W.2d at 594. 
122. See, e.g., In re J.M., 2006 ND 96, ¶ 14, 713 N.W.2d 518, 523 (finding the third element 
met by a diagnosis of disorder and by actuarial test scores). 
123. In re Anderson, 2007 ND 50, ¶ 56, 730 N.W.2d 570, 586 (Kapsner, J., dissenting). 
124. Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment With Sex 
Offenders:  Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1469-71 
(2003). 
125. Anderson, ¶ 57, 730 N.W.2d at 586 (Kapsner, J., dissenting).  See also In re Barrera, 
2008 ND 25, ¶¶ 10-11, 744 N.W.2d 744, 746-47; In re Hehn, 2008 ND 36, ¶ 21, 745 N.W.2d 631, 
636. 
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(3) extrafamilial victims, and (4) male victims.”126  The Static-99 expands 
upon the RRASOR by including the same four factors, but also adding “the 
number of prior sentencing dates[,] . . . any convictions for non-contact sex 
offenses[,] . . . index case nonsexual violence[,] . . . prior nonsexual 
violence[,] . . . any stranger victims,” and “whether the individual is 
single.”127  The MnSOST-R, on the other hand, measures sixteen variables, 
including the relationship between the offender and its victims, the 
offender’s age, and the offender’s criminal history.128  In all of these tests, a 
score is calculated and then compared to the known recidivism rate of 
offenders with similar scores.129  This calculation and comparison method 
has been criticized because deprivation of liberty is based not upon the 
offender’s own behavior, but upon the behavior of others who are 
statistically similar.130 
The North Dakota Supreme Court has cautioned that judicial decision-
making should not be replaced by actuarial scores or a contest over percent-
age points.131  In fact, an individual may still be found sexually dangerous 
despite actuarial scores that indicated the individual was not likely to 
recidivate.132  Accordingly, while actuarial scores may be used as a part of 
the evaluation, testimony by those who know the individual may also help 
an evaluator to determine whether the individual is likely to reoffend.133 
d. Serious Difficulty Controlling Behavior 
In addition to the statutory requirements of the definition of sexually 
dangerous individual, a finding that the individual has a “serious difficulty 
controlling his behavior” is required to distinguish the individual from a 
typical criminal.134  To satisfy this requirement, behavior while in confine-
ment is often evaluated, including failing to progress in treatment, breaking 
rules, or lacking empathy for victims.135  This requirement does not consti-
tute a fourth element to the statutory definition of a sexually dangerous 
                                                     
126. Janus & Prentky, supra note 124, at 1469; see also Anderson, ¶ 58, 730 N.W.2d at 586-
87 (Kapsner, J., dissenting) (explaining RRASOR factors). 
127. Anderson, ¶ 60, 730 N.W.2d at 587 (Kapsner, J., dissenting). 
128. Conroy, supra note 85, at 185; Anderson, 2007 ND 50, ¶ 61, 730 N.W.2d at 587-88 
(Kapsner, J., dissenting). 
129. Anderson, ¶ 64, 730 N.W.2d at 588-89 (Kapsner, J., dissenting). 
130. Janus & Prentky, supra note 124, at 1476-77 (citing In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 
616 (Minn. 1994) (Coyne, J., dissenting)). 
131. Hehn, ¶ 21, 745 N.W.2d at 636. 
132. Id.; In re M.D. (M.D. II), 2008 ND 208, ¶ 10, 757 N.W.2d 559, 562. 
133. Hehn, ¶ 24, 745 N.W.2d at 637; M.D. II, ¶¶ 9-11, 757 N.W.2d at 561-62. 
134. Hehn, ¶ 19, 745 N.W.2d at 636; accord Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002). 
135. See M.D. II, ¶ 11, 757 N.W.2d 559, 562 (finding an inability to control behavior based 
on a failure to progress in treatment); see also In re R.A.S., 2009 ND 101, ¶ 16, 766 N.W.2d 712, 
716 (finding an inability to control behavior based on acts while in confinement). 
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individual.136  Instead, the requirement may be viewed as a condition that 
must be satisfied before an individual may be committed.137  This finding is 
also subject to the clear and convincing standard used for the definition of a 
sexually dangerous individual.138 
III. ANALYSIS 
Justice Sandstrom wrote the majority opinion for the North Dakota 
Supreme Court affirming the district court’s denial of the petition for 
discharge in G.R.H. II, holding the State provided clear and convincing 
evidence that G.R.H. remained a sexually dangerous individual.139  Justice 
Kapsner wrote a concurring opinion in which she agreed affirming the 
district court’s order was appropriate under the circumstance, but asserted 
the facts of the case implicated an issue not raised by G.R.H. on appeal.140  
In her concurrence, Justice Kapsner expanded upon G.R.H.’s argument that 
required disclosure was unfair and discussed the constitutional implications 
of the use of self-incriminating statements in commitment proceedings.141 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
On appeal, G.R.H. argued the State failed to provide sufficient 
evidence satisfying the three-element definition.142  Conceding the first 
element, G.R.H. argued the State failed to meet its burden to prove the final 
two elements of a sexually dangerous individual finding.143  The court 
disagreed with G.R.H., holding evidence supported the district court’s 
finding that G.R.H. had a condition that was manifested by a disorder or 
dysfunction.144  Further, the court held evidence supported the finding that 
G.R.H. was likely to engage in predatory behavior in the future.145 
1. Sexually Predatory Conduct 
Because G.R.H. did not contest the district court’s finding he had 
engaged in sexually predatory conduct, the court did not address the first 
                                                     
136. R.A.S., ¶ 15, 766 N.W.2d at 716. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. ¶ 17, 766 N.W.2d at 716. 
139. In re G.R.H. (G.R.H. II), 2008 ND 222, ¶¶ 1, 5, 14, 758 N.W.2d 719, 720-21, 724.  
Justice Sandstrom’s majority opinion was joined by Justice Crothers, Justice Maring, and Chief 
Justice VandeWalle. Id. ¶ 15, 758 N.W.2d at 724. 
140. G.R.H. II, ¶¶ 26-27, 758 N.W.2d at 727 (J. Kapsner, concurring). 
141. Id. ¶¶ 23-25, 758 N.W.2d at 725-27. 
142. Id. ¶¶ 8, 12, 758 N.W.2d at 722-23. 
143. Id. ¶ 5, 758 N.W.2d at 721. 
144. Id. ¶ 11, 758 N.W.2d at 723. 
145. Id. ¶ 13, 758 N.W.2d at 724. 
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element of the definition of a sexually dangerous individual.146  G.R.H.’s 
criminal history, however, easily fell under the definition of sexually 
predatory conduct because his gross sexual imposition conviction involved 
a victim younger than fifteen years of age, and his corruption of a minor 
conviction involved a sixteen-year-old.147  The court also explained all 
sexually predatory conduct may be considered under the analysis of a 
sexually dangerous individual; even conduct “which did not result in a 
charge or conviction.”148  Arguably, the court could have considered 
G.R.H.’s confession to contact with additional adolescent victims between 
his two imprisonment terms if G.R.H. would have challenged the findings 
under this element.149 
2. Disorder Requirement 
G.R.H. argued the second element was not met because, at the dis-
charge hearing, the State failed to provide clear and convincing evidence he 
had a condition manifested by a disorder.150  At the discharge hearing, there 
was conflicting testimony between experts as to the diagnosis of G.R.H.’s 
disorder.151  The independent expert evaluator appointed on G.R.H.’s behalf 
testified that G.R.H. did not meet the second element; the State’s expert 
testified to the contrary.152  G.R.H. implicitly argued the independent 
evaluator’s report and testimony were more reliable because the report and 
testimony were more thorough, making the district court’s finding unsup-
ported by clear and convincing evidence.153 
                                                     
146. See id. ¶ 5, 758 N.W.2d at 721 (noting G.R.H. contested the second and third elements 
without contesting the first element). 
147. Compare In re G.R.H. (G.R.H. I), 2006 ND 56, ¶ 2, 711 N.W.2d 587, 589 (explaining 
G.R.H.’s previous convictions), with N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-03.3-01(9)(a)(4), (7) (2008) 
(defining sexually predatory conduct as sexual contact with a victim if “[t]he victim is less than 
fifteen years old” or “[t]he victim is a minor and the actor is an adult”). 
148. G.R.H. II, ¶ 7, 758 N.W.2d at 722. 
149. See id. ¶¶ 7-9, 12-13, 758 N.W.2d at 722-24 (noting conduct not resulting in a charge or 
conviction may be considered in an analysis under North Dakota Century Code section 25-03.3-
01(8)). 
150. Id. ¶ 8, 758 N.W.2d at 722. 
151. Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 758 N.W.2d at 721. 
152. Brief of Petitioner-Appellee at 2-3, In re G.R.H., 2008 ND 222, 758 N.W.2d 719 (No. 
20080102).  The independent evaluator diagnosed G.R.H. with psychoactive substance abuse—
abusing more than one psychoactive substance—and also “found personality disorder not other-
wise specified with some borderline, antisocial, narcissistic, schizophrenic-like behavior, and 
paranoid features.” G.R.H. II, ¶¶ 3-4, 758 N.W.2d at 721.  The State’s expert diagnosed G.R.H. 
with anti-social personality disorder and paraphilia, not otherwise-specified hebephilia—the 
sexual attraction to adolescents. Id. 
153. See Brief of Respondent-Appellant ¶ 37, In re G.R.H., 2008 ND 222, 758 N.W.2d 719 
(No. 20080102) (noting Dr. Coombs’ (State’s expert) report was only nine pages long while Dr. 
Riedel’s (independent expert) report was eighty-one pages in length). 
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Rejecting G.R.H.’s argument, the court held the district court’s analysis 
of the second element was supported by clear and convincing evidence.154  
The district court sided with the State’s expert for two reasons.155  First, the 
testimony of the State’s evaluator was more reliable because his opinion 
was better-informed.156  The State evaluator’s testimony reflected consider-
ation of the additional adolescent victims, something lacking in the inde-
pendent evaluator’s initial testimony.157  Second, the diagnosis asserted by 
the State’s evaluator was more credible because consideration of the 
additional adolescent victims supported G.R.H.’s diagnosis of a sexual 
attraction to adolescents, in addition to anti-social personality disorder.158  
Although he initially diagnosed G.R.H. with anti-social personality dis-
order, the independent evaluator conceded during testimony that a diagnosis 
of hebephilia was more justified if the additional victims were con-
sidered.159  Accordingly, as to the second element, the court held the district 
court’s findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence.160 
3. Future Predatory Conduct 
G.R.H. argued the third element was not met because the State failed to 
provide clear and convincing evidence his condition made him likely to 
commit more acts of sexually predatory conduct.161  The testimony of the 
two experts diverged on the third element as well, with the State’s expert 
opining G.R.H. was likely to reoffend and the independent expert coming to 
the opposite conclusion.162  G.R.H., again, argued the independent evalua-
tor’s testimony was more credible because that evaluator conducted 
numerous risk assessments and completed an eighty-one page report; the 
State’s expert did not initially conduct any tests, but instead updated 
assessments done by previous evaluators.163 
                                                     
154. G.R.H. II, ¶ 11, 758 N.W.2d at 723. 
155. See id. (finding both Dr. Coombs’ testimony and diagnosis more reliable). 
156. Id. 
157. Id.  The Court explained the district court believed Dr. Riedel was credible, just less 
informed. Id.  On cross examination, Dr. Riedel conceded that consideration of the additional 
victims was absent from his initial report and a diagnosis of hebephilia would be more justified. 
Brief of Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 152, ¶ 5. 
158. G.R.H. II, ¶ 3, 758 N.W.2d at 721. 
159. Id. ¶ 8, 758 N.W.2d at 722-23; Brief of Respondent-Appellant, supra note 153, ¶ 36; 
Brief of Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 152, at 2. 
160. G.R.H. II, ¶ 11, 758 N.W.2d at 723.  Consistent with its earlier determination that the 
trial court is the best evaluator of credibility in cases of conflicting testimony, the court did not 
“second-guess the credibility determinations made by the trial court.” Id. ¶ 7, 758 N.W.2d at 722 
(quoting In re Hehn, 2008 ND 36, ¶ 23, 745 N.W.2d 631, 637). 
161. G.R.H. II, ¶ 12, 758 N.W.2d at 723. 
162. Id. ¶ 12, 758 N.W.2d at 723-24; Brief of Respondent-Appellant, supra note 153, ¶ 53. 
163. Brief of Respondent-Appellant, supra note 153, ¶ 51. 
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The court rejected G.R.H.’s argument and agreed with the district 
court’s finding that the third element was satisfied by clear and convincing 
evidence.164  The court gave three justifications as to why the district 
court’s findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence.165  First, 
the court noted the State’s expert testified G.R.H.’s likelihood to reoffend 
was bolstered by reevaluated actuarial tests that placed G.R.H. between a 
twenty-one and sixty-five percent chance of reoffending.166  The inde-
pendent evaluator also testified to the results of tests, but his results placed 
G.R.H. at a different risk of reoffending.167  Consistent with previous 
decisions, the court noted it would not be caught in “a contest over percent-
age points” as to whether or not an individual was likely to reoffend.168  
Although the test scores alone were not conclusive, they did not need to 
be.169 
Second, G.R.H. demonstrated his lack of self-discipline while in treat-
ment.170  G.R.H. engaged in rule-breaking behavior during treatment by 
calling sex-line numbers and having sexual relations with visitors.171  As a 
result, G.R.H.’s treatment status was downgraded due to lack of self-
control.172  Both his rule-breaking behavior and his admission of additional 
adolescent victims indicated G.R.H. had a serious difficulty controlling his 
behavior.173 
Third, the combination of G.R.H.’s disorders and actions proved 
G.R.H. would be more likely to engage in predatory conduct if released.174  
The State’s expert testified that G.R.H’s anti-social personality disorder and 
his sexual attraction to adolescents, mixed with his rule-breaking behavior 
and his admission to additional adolescent victims, made him more likely to 
commit another offense.175  The court explained that unlike a typical 
criminal, G.R.H.’s inability to control his behavior made him more likely to 
                                                     
164. G.R.H. II, ¶ 13, 758 N.W.2d at 724. 
165. See infra text accompanying notes 166-78. 
166. G.R.H. II, ¶ 12, 758 N.W.2d at 723.  G.R.H.’s score placed him at “a twenty-one per-
cent likelihood of reoffending in ten years” on the RRASOR, “a fifty-two percent likelihood of 
reconviction in fifteen years” on the Static-99, and “a six-year likelihood of rearrest rate for a 
sexual offense of fifty-six percentage” on the MnSOST-R. Id. 
167. Id. ¶ 13, 758 N.W.2d at 724. 
168. Id. (quoting In re Hehn, 2008 ND 36, ¶ 21, 745 N.W.2d 631, 636). 
169. G.R.H. II, ¶ 13, 758 N.W.2d at 724. 
170. Id. ¶ 12, 758 N.W.2d at 723. 
171. Brief of Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 152, at 10. 
172. G.R.H. II, ¶ 12, 758 N.W.2d at 723. 
173. Id. ¶ 13, 758 N.W.2d at 724.  This finding satisfied the requirements of Hehn and Crane 
that there must be a finding the individual has serious difficulty controlling his behavior.  See 
supra text accompanying notes 134-38. 
174. G.R.H. II, ¶ 13, 758 N.W.2d at 724. 
175. Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 758 N.W.2d at 723-24. 
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reoffend if not kept in treatment.176  For these reasons, the district court’s 
finding that G.R.H. was likely to engage in further acts of predatory 
conduct was supported by clear and convincing evidence.177  Accordingly, 
the court affirmed the district court’s finding that G.R.H. remained a 
sexually dangerous individual and upheld the district court’s order denying 
G.R.H.’s petition for discharge.178 
B. JUSTICE KAPSNER’S CONCURRING OPINION 
With the sole concurrence, Justice Kapsner wrote separately to explain 
G.R.H.’s continuing confinement was based upon self-incriminating 
statements.179  Justice Kapsner pointed out G.R.H. could have argued his 
civil commitment was punitive, so the prohibition against self-incriminating 
statements applied.180  The concurrence was an expansion of G.R.H.’s 
supporting argument that it was unfair to force committed individuals, as a 
part of their treatment, to disclose past misdeeds or have their refusal to 
disclose past misdeeds held against them.181  However, G.R.H. failed to 
specifically raise an argument that this unfairness made the statutes punitive 
in effect.182  Therefore, it was appropriate to affirm the district court’s 
findings.183 
Justice Kapsner began by noting the similarity between civil commit-
ment and criminal law, which both end in deprivation of liberty.184  Yet, as 
Justice Kapsner explained, constitutional challenges to civil commitment 
laws have been overcome by arguing the purpose of the laws was not to 
punish, but to provide treatment for the offender.185  As Justice Kapsner 
noted, the North Dakota civil commitment law could be defended against 
constitutional challenges because it specifically provided placement of 
individuals “in an appropriate facility or program at which treatment is 
available.”186 
                                                     
176. Id. ¶ 13, 758 N.W.2d at 724. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. ¶ 14, 758 N.W.2d at 724. 
179. Id. ¶ 23, 758 N.W.2d at 725-26 (Kapsner, J., concurring). 
180. Id. ¶ 26, 758 N.W.2d at 727. 
181. Brief of Respondent-Appellant ¶ 36, In re G.R.H., 2008 ND 222, 758 N.W.2d 719 (No. 
20080102). 
182. G.R.H. II, ¶ 26, 758 N.W.2d at 727 (Kapsner, J., concurring). 
183. Id. ¶ 27, 758 N.W.2d at 727. 
184. Id. ¶ 17, 758 N.W.2d at 725. 
185. Id. (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) and Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 
364, 373-74 (1986)). 
186. G.R.H. II, ¶ 19, 758 N.W.2d at 725 (Kapsner, J., concurring) (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 25-03.3-13 (2008)). 
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Justice Kapsner’s analysis did not stop there, however, because a law’s 
civil label is not enough when a defendant can provide the “clearest proof” 
the statute is “so punitive in either purpose or effect as to negate” the 
intention of the State.187  This approach was attempted in Allen, where the 
petitioner argued an Illinois civil commitment law was punitive; thus, he 
should have been entitled to the prohibition against self-incrimination.188  
The argument in Allen was unsuccessful, but Justice Kapsner noted impor-
tant differences between Allen and G.R.H. II.189 
First, North Dakota law specifically invalidates any confidentiality 
between a patient and a psychiatrist in the context of civil commitment, 
which means that any information disclosed during treatment can be used 
against the individual.190  North Dakota law also limits admissibility of the 
outcomes of civil commitments in subsequent criminal cases.191  However, 
no such limit exists for the actual facts relied upon for commitment, so self-
incriminating statements may be used during the civil commitment hearing 
and any subsequent criminal case.192  Unlike criminal proceedings, the term 
of confinement is indefinite when an individual is committed based upon 
statements made during treatment.193  This was not the situation in Allen, as 
Illinois law disallowed the use of statements to psychiatrists during 
treatment in any subsequent criminal proceeding.194 
Second, North Dakota civil commitment jurisprudence holds that 
failure to comply with treatment may be used to determine an individual’s 
status as a sexually dangerous individual.195  If individuals refuse to admit 
past sexual conduct as a part of their treatment, their refusal can be used 
against them at a commitment hearing.196  As Justice Kapsner summarized, 
                                                     
187. G.R.H. II, ¶ 22, 758 N.W.2d at 725 (Kapsner, J., concurring) (quoting Allen, 478 U.S. at 
369). 
188. Allen, 478 U.S. at 370. 
189. G.R.H. II, ¶ 21, 758 N.W.2d at 725 (Kapsner, J., concurring). 
190. Id. ¶ 23, 758 N.W.2d at 725-26; see also § 25-03.3-05 (explaining the abrogation of 
confidentiality). 
191. § 25-03.3-16. 
192. G.R.H. II, ¶ 23, 758 N.W.2d at 726 (Kapsner, J., concurring). 
193. Id. 
194. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986). 
195. G.R.H. II, ¶ 24, 758 N.W.2d at  726 (Kapsner, J., concurring). 
196. Id. ¶ 25, 758 N.W.2d at 727.  See also Klein, supra note 25, at 713-14 (describing an 
individual’s decision of whether to invoke the Fifth Amendment or answer to his or her detriment 
as a “Hobson’s choice”); Merrill A. Maiano, Sex Offender Probationers and the Fifth Amendment:  
Rethinking Compulsion and Exploring Preventative Measures in the Face of Required Treatment 
Programs, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 989, 999 (2006) (describing a situation where sex-
offenders are forced to incriminate themselves in the face of revoked probation or face incar-
ceration for revealing the details of uncharged offenses as a “Catch 22”); Anita Schlank and Rick 
Harry, Essay:  The Treatment of the Civilly Committed Sex Offender in Minnesota:  A Review of 
the Past Ten Years, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1221, 1223-24 (2003) (describing a “Hobson’s 
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“[i]f disclosure is demanded as a prerequisite to treatment and either the 
disclosure or the failure to comply is the basis for continuing confinement, 
the ability to assert a privilege has been lost.”197  Such a dilemma and the 
resulting loss of liberty, according to Justice Kapsner, might have proven 
the civil commitment statutes were punitive in effect.198  The concurrence 
closed by noting G.R.H. did not raise such a challenge, and by stating the 
case should not be viewed as precluding a properly-raised argument with 
facts similar to those in G.R.H. II.199 
IV. IMPACT 
The focus of the court throughout its analysis, both in the majority 
opinion and the concurrence, was on the confessions G.R.H. made during 
treatment.200  In terms of North Dakota case law, G.R.H. II is an expansion 
of the scope of conduct that can be considered for an analysis of whether a 
person is a sexually dangerous individual.201  Further, the concurrence has 
fueled challenges to civil commitments in North Dakota.202 
A. SCOPE OF SEXUALLY PREDATORY CONDUCT 
Early in its majority opinion, the court explained all sexually predatory 
conduct could be considered for the purposes of civil commitment, and the 
court then proceeded to focus on the admission by G.R.H. that he engaged 
in such conduct with additional victims.203  The court’s explanation 
stemmed from P.F., but the court’s holding in that case resulted from its 
consideration of conduct that resulted in a charge or conviction.204  
G.R.H.’s conduct resulted in neither a charge nor a conviction, yet the court 
stated all conduct, presumably including G.R.H.’s disclosures of additional 
victims, could be considered.205  Compared to the analysis in G.R.H. II, the 
P.F. holding now takes into account all conduct that did not result in a 
charge or conviction, as well as the conduct contained in disclosures by 
                                                                                                                           
choice” for sex offenders who will have disclosed information used against them in civil commit-
ment hearings or have their refusal to participate in treatment also used against them). 
197. G.R.H. II, ¶ 25, 758 N.W.2d at 727 (Kapsner, J., concurring). 
198. Id. ¶ 26, 758 N.W.2d at 727. 
199. Id. ¶ 27. 
200. See id. ¶¶ 1-27, 758 N.W.2d at 720-27 (referring to the statements eleven times in the 
majority opinion and four times in the concurrence). 
201. See supra text accompanying notes 146-49. 
202. See infra text accompanying notes 213-16. 
203. G.R.H. II, ¶ 7, 758 N.W.2d at 722. 
204. In re P.F., 2006 ND 82, ¶ 21, 712 N.W.2d 610, 616. 
205. G.R.H. II, ¶ 7, 758 N.W.2d at 722. 
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committed individuals.206  Thus, if there was any doubt as to the scope of 
relevant sexually predatory conduct, G.R.H. II should be viewed as an 
affirmation that all sexually predatory conduct is relevant under the analysis 
of a sexually dangerous individual, including disclosures made by commit-
ted individuals themselves.207 
B. CHALLENGES TO THE CIVIL COMMITMENT LAWS 
Justice Kapsner’s concurrence, noting G.R.H. II should not be viewed 
as precluding a punitive challenge, alluded to potential challenges based on 
the use of self-incriminating statements.208  The success of an argument that 
the civil commitment of the sexually dangerous is punitive when self-
incriminating statements are used against an individual would depend upon 
distinguishing Allen, just as Justice Kapsner’s concurrence sought to do in 
G.R.H. II.209  An important difference for Justice Kapsner was the fact that 
Illinois law barred the statements Allen made to psychiatrists from future 
use in criminal prosecution, something absent from North Dakota law.210  
Other jurisdictions have rejected similar claims of violations of the Fifth 
Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause, but those jurisdictions also recog-
nize that the statements cannot be used in later criminal proceedings.211  
                                                     
206. Compare P.F., 2006 ND 82, ¶ 21, 712 N.W.2d at 616 (holding all conduct, including 
that which did not result in a charge or conviction, may be included in analysis), with G.R.H. II, 
¶¶ 7-8, 758 N.W.2d at 722-23 (noting all conduct, including self-incriminating statements, can be 
included in analysis). 
207. See, e.g., In re Vantreece, 2009 ND 152, ¶ 17, 771 N.W.2d 585, 591 (citing G.R.H. II 
for the proposition that all sexually predatory conduct may be considered); In re A.M., 2009 ND 
104, ¶ 10, 766 N.W.2d 437, 440 (citing G.R.H. II for the proposition that all sexually predatory 
conduct may be considered).  The North Dakota Supreme Court has subsequently explained that 
only conduct that meets the specific definition of “sexually predatory conduct” may be considered 
for the first element of a sexually dangerous individual analysis, while “all conduct of a sexually 
predatory nature” may be considered for determination of the second element and “all relevant 
conduct should be considered” for the third element.  See In re Voisine, 2010 ND 17, ¶¶ 12-14, 
777 N.W.2d 908, 912-13 (holding incest between consenting adults does not meet the statutory 
definition of “sexually predatory conduct”). 
208. See G.R.H. II, ¶ 26, 758 N.W.2d at 727 (Kapsner, J., concurring) (explaining “[t]his 
case should not be understood, however, to mean the issue could not be examined, if properly 
raised”). 
209. G.R.H. II, ¶ 21, 758 N.W.2d at 725 (Kapsner, J., concurring) (explaining “[t]he 
circumstances in Allen were different from those G.R.H. has experienced”). 
210. Id. ¶¶ 21, 23, 758 N.W.2d at 725-26 (Kapsner, J., concurring).  Arguably, a committed 
individual would have to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege to not answer the questions and 
also fear he would be committed even if he did not answer the questions.  See State v. Crabtree, 
2008 ND 174, ¶ 23, 756 N.W.2d 189, 197 (holding:  (1) statements made by a probationer, who 
voluntarily took a polygraph and admitted to having sexual contact with a minor, were not 
compelled because the probationer was not coerced; and (2) that he would not be punished for 
asserting the privilege). 
211. See, e.g., In re Sutton, 828 So. 2d 1081, 1082 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (noting the 
Fifth Amendment does not allow an individual subject to commitment to avoid a deposition, but 
also noting the individual may object to specific questions if the answer would incriminate the 
individual); Madison v. Craven, 169 P.3d 284, 290 (Idaho 2007) (noting the Fifth Amendment 
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The success of a future challenge to a North Dakota civil commitment of 
the sexually dangerous would hinge upon an acceptance that continuing 
confinement based upon self-incrimination or refusal to self-incriminate, 
combined with a lack of protection against future criminal prosecution, is in 
fact “the clearest proof” envisioned by the majority in Allen.212 
A similar argument was raised in In re Maedche,213 where incriminating 
statements made during a probationary pre-polygraph interview and 
examination were later used as evidence in a civil commitment proceed-
ing.214  After being committed as a sexually dangerous individual, Maedche 
appealed arguing the trial court’s consideration of the statements made 
during the polygraph violated his privilege against self-incrimination.215  
The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected this argument when it held that 
Maedche had “not offered ‘the clearest proof’ that North Dakota’s statutory 
scheme is ‘so punitive’ that it must be considered criminal.”216  
                                                                                                                           
Self-Incrimination Clause does not apply to statements of a prisoner admitting to sexual attraction 
to his daughter because the statements could not be used in future criminal proceedings); Bankes 
v. Simmones, 963 P.2d 412, 419-20 (Kan. 1998) (noting the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination 
Clause does not apply to the Kansas Sexual Predator Act because the Act is civil, but also noting 
that if a prisoner is given no choice but to provide incriminating information, the State must give 
the prisoner immunity or be barred from using that information at subsequent criminal proceed-
ings); Razor v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d 472, 474 (Ky. App. 1997) (holding a probationer’s 
right against self-incrimination is not violated when an admission of crimes was required as part 
of treatment because the statements could not be used in subsequent criminal prosecution); In re 
Canupp, 671 S.E.2d 614, 617 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008) (noting the Fifth Amendment does not allow 
an individual subject to commitment as a sexually violent predator to refuse to take the stand 
altogether, but also noting he can refuse to answer questions that would incriminate him); In re 
Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637, 654 (Tex. 2005) (noting the Fifth Amendment does not allow an 
individual subject to commitment to avoid the stand altogether, but also noting if the individual 
were to blurt out incriminating statements, the court would excise the statements from the record 
or grant the individual immunity).  But see In re Commitment of Mark, 2006 WI 78, ¶¶ 14-15, 33, 
292 Wis.2d 1, ¶¶ 14-15, 33, 718 N.W.2d 90, ¶¶ 14-15, 33 (finding statements made to a parole 
officer about an attempt to forcibly enter a neighbor’s residence to have sex may be a violation of 
the Self-Incrimination Clause during a trial to commit the individual as sexually dangerous). 
212. Compare Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986) (describing clearest proof), with 
G.R.H. II, ¶¶ 21-23, 758 N.W.2d at 725-26 (Kapsner, J., concurring) (explaining lack of protection 
against use of evidence in a “subsequent criminal proceeding” and inability to assert privilege 
when “disclosure or the failure to comply is the basis for continuing confinement”). 
213. 2010 ND 171, 788 N.W.2d 331. 
214. Id. ¶¶ 4-6, 788 N.W.2d at 333-34.  The statements “disclosed previously unknown 
sexual contact with minors that had occurred when he was an adult.” Id. ¶ 4, 788 N.W.2d at 333. 
215. Id. ¶ 19, 788 N.W.2d at 337. 
216. Id. ¶ 23, 788 N.W.2d at 337.  Justice Kapsner dissented from the majority opinion, 
explaining that the record in Maedche demonstrated why the sexually dangerous individual law 
was punitive in nature. Id. ¶ 30, 788 N.W.2d at 338 (Kapsner, J., dissenting). 
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C. CHANGES TO THE CIVIL COMMITMENT LAWS 
At minimum, G.R.H. II is illustrative of the opposing interests that 
compete in programs to treat sex offenders.217  The confined individuals 
who are a part of the treatment program have an interest to avoid incrimi-
nating themselves during treatment.218  The State has an interest both to 
treat the individuals in order to protect the safety of the public and to 
prosecute serious crimes.219  North Dakota law currently approaches this 
situation by prohibiting the use of final determinations in civil commit-
ments in subsequent criminal proceedings.220  However, North Dakota law 
is silent as to the use of evidence considered in order to determine whether 
someone is a sexually dangerous individual.221 
Commentators offer a number of suggestions to resolve the tension 
between the competing interests in treatment programs that require dis-
closure of past misdeeds.  There is a consensus among these commentators 
that disclosure by the offender is necessary for treatment to be successful.222  
The commentators’ opinions, however, diverge on what should be done 
once the disclosures are made.  One commentator posits mandatory poly-
graph testing is an indispensible part of sex offender treatment, but 
acknowledges the individual should be allowed to not answer incriminating 
questions.223  Another commentator commends Wisconsin’s approach, 
which makes polygraph testing optional and declines to punish an indi-
vidual who refuses to participate in polygraph testing.224  Some suggest it is 
necessary to grant outright immunity during polygraph testing, but another 
believes granting immunity is inconsistent with the goals of treatment 
                                                     
217. See Maiano, supra note 196, at 1000 (describing “conflict between the government’s 
interest in treating sex offenders, the government’s interest in prosecuting sex offenders, and the 
offender’s right to remain silent during the course of government mandated treatment”); Angela 
Kebric, Polygraph Testing in Sex Offender Treatment:  A Constitutional and Essential Tool for 
Effective Treatment, 41 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 429, 439-40 (2009) (describing “tension between two 
competing interests: [p]reserving a sex offender’s privilege against self-incrimination and 
obtaining information necessary for effective treatment.”). 
218. Kebric, supra note 217, at 440. 
219. Maiano, supra note 196, at 1000. 
220. In re G.R.H. (G.R.H. II), 2008 ND 222, ¶ 23, 758 N.W.2d 719, 726 (Kapsner, J., 
concurring) (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-16 (2008)). 
221. G.R.H. II, ¶ 23, 758 N.W.2d at 726 (Kapsner, J., concurring). 
222. David Heim, Note,  Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t—Why Minnesota’s 
Prison-Based Sex Offender Treatment Program Violates the Right Against Self-Incrimination, 32 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1217, 1249 (2006); Jonathan Kaden, Therapy for Convicted Sex 
Offenders:  Pursuing Rehabilitation Without Incrimination, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 347, 
367 (1998); Kebric, supra note 217, at 440; Schlank & Harry, supra note 196, at 1223-24. 
223. Kebric, supra note 217, at 443, 447. 
224. Maiano, supra note 196, at 1019-20. 
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because it undermines the gravity of sex offenses.225  Still others believe 
denial should be embraced for a limited time so the individual can progress 
in treatment and eventually overcome denial.226 
A sensible change to North Dakota law, which is necessary as demon-
strated in G.R.H. II, is to ameliorate the problem by balancing the interests 
involved in committing the sexually dangerous.227  If treatment and its 
rehabilitative result are improved through confession by the committed 
individual, then confession should be encouraged in the interest of public 
safety.228  The committed individuals, however, should not fear prosecution 
based upon their honest disclosures.229  A rational compromise would be to 
limit the use of facts disclosed during confessions to the hearing for 
determination of a sexually dangerous individual and prohibit the use of 
those facts in future criminal prosecutions.230  Such an approach balances 
the interests involved and minimizes the possibility of punitive challenges 
based upon the arguments raised in Justice Kapsner’s concurrence.231  The 
proper and most effective venue for this change to North Dakota law is with 
the policy-making legislative branch.232  While affording sexually danger-
ous individuals greater procedural protections may not be politically 
popular, the legal community “must always remain cognizant that the fervor 
of a rightfully outraged public to prevent [heinous] crimes cannot be 
                                                     
225. Compare Jamie Tanabe, Right Against Self Incrimination v. Public Safety:  Does 
Hawaii’s Sex Offender Treatment Program Violate the Fifth Amendment?, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 
825, 854 (2001), and Heim, supra note 222, at 1249, with Maiano, supra note 196, at 1015-16. 
226. Heim, supra note 222, at 1247; Kaden, supra note 222, at 370. 
227. See Maiano, supra note 196, at 1019-20 (noting Wisconsin’s approach to sex offender 
treatment). 
228. See Kebric, supra note 217, at 439 (arguing polygraph testing effectuates treatment, 
reduces recidivism, and increases the public safety); Heim, supra note 222, at 1249 (arguing 
“[i]mmunity would also encourage the offender to accept responsibility and complete the therapy 
process). 
229. See Maiano, supra note 196, at 999-1000 (noting competing interests in sex offender 
treatment). 
230. See id. at 1019-20 (noting Wisconsin’s approach to sex offender treatment).  A major 
criticism of this approach is that prosecutors will be inhibited from pursuing charges for what 
could be heinous crimes, but this does not completely foreclose prosecution, only the use of the 
statements in the subsequent prosecution.  See Heim, supra note 222, at 1249 (stating “immunity 
would not harm the State’s interests if it does not plan to use the statements in the future”); 
Tanabe, supra note 225, at 851 (stating “a defendant is immunized from prosecution based on his 
immunized statements but is not immunized from any and all prosecution”); Maiano, supra note 
196, at 1016 (stating “immunity only foreclose[s] prosecution based on the compelled 
testimony”). 
231. Maiano, supra note 196, at 1019-20; In re G.R.H. (G.R.H. II), 2008 ND 222, ¶ 26, 758 
N.W.2d 719, 727 (Kapsner, J., concurring).  But see In re Maedche, 2010 ND 171, ¶ 21, 788 
N.W.2d 331, 337 (explaining a subsequent challenge based upon arguments similar to those raised 
in G.R.H. II’s concurrence). 
232. See In re Voisine, 2010 ND 17, ¶ 10, 777 N.W.2d 908, 912 (explaining “[t]he function 
of the courts is to interpret the law, not to legislate, regardless of how much we might desire to do 
so” (internal quotations omitted)). 
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allowed to overcome the necessary safeguards to individual liberty the law 
has established.”233 
V. CONCLUSION 
In G.R.H. II, the North Dakota Supreme Court held there was clear and 
convincing evidence G.R.H. remained a sexually dangerous individual.234  
G.R.H.’s previous criminal history, his confessions during treatment, his 
diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder and sexual attraction to adoles-
cents, and his lack of self-control satisfied the definition of a sexually 
dangerous individual.235  Justice Kapsner’s concurrence fueled challenges 
based upon self-incriminating statements, which could be avoided by 
disallowing use of such statements in subsequent criminal trials.236 
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233. In re J.M., 2006 ND 96, ¶ 18, 713 N.W.2d 518, 523. 
234. G.R.H. II, ¶ 14, 758 N.W.2d at 724. 
235. Id. ¶¶ 8, 11-13, 758 N.W.2d at 722-24. 
236. See supra text accompanying notes 227-33 (arguing North Dakota law should disallow 
the use of self-incriminating statements in subsequent criminal proceedings). 
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